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Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

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  • Pascalis Raimondos-M¯ller

Abstract

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above-optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the 'arm's length' principle--the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD--may not be Pareto improving. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 230-246

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:54:y:2002:i:2:p:230-246

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Cited by:
  1. Tomáš Buus & Jaroslav BRADA, 2010. "VAT and Tax Credits: A Way to Eliminate Tax-Evasive Use of Transfer Prices?," European Financial and Accounting Journal, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(1), pages 28-50.
  2. Hindriks, Jean J.G. & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2013. "Local taxation of global corporations: a simple solution," CEPR Discussion Papers 9350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Jaroslav BRADA & Tomáš Buus, 2009. "Detection of Possible Tax-Evasive Transfer Pricing in Multinational Enterprises," European Financial and Accounting Journal, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(2), pages 65-78.
  4. Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 642, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. AMERIGHI, Oscar & PERALTA, Susana, . "The proximity-concentration trade-off with profit shifting," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2202, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Diaw, K., 2004. "Ownership Restrictions, Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Policy," Discussion Paper 2004-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Tomáš Buus & Jaroslav BRADA, 2010. "Can Profit-shifting be Resolved by Penalization?," European Financial and Accounting Journal, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(3), pages 56-74.
  8. PERALTA, Susana & WAUTHY, Xavier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, . "Should countries control international profit shifting?," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1795, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Vlachos, Jonas, 2006. "Cross-Border Acquisitions and Corporate Taxes: Efficiency and Tax Revenues," Working Paper Series 663, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  10. Tomáš Buus & Jaroslav Brada, 2008. "On the Properties of Transfer Pricing Rules," Český finanční a účetní časopis, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2008(3), pages 39-55.

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