Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric Helland
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Although flat fees are common for divorces, wills and trusts, and probate, lawyers in personal injury cases generally are paid by contingency fee or at an hourly rate. Arguments have been made that contingency fees increase low-quality, "frivolous" litigation but counterarguments suggest that contingency fees actually limit such litigation and instead it is hourly fees that increase low-quality litigation. Using a difference in differences test and data on a cross section of states in 1992, we test whether legal quality is lower under contingency or hourly fees. We also examine medical malpractice claims in Florida using a time series centered around a law change that limited contingency fees. We also examine the impact of fee arrangements on the expected time to settlement. We find that hourly fees encourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the time to settlement (i.e., contingency fees increase legal quality and decrease the time to settlement). Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 517-542

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:517-542

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
    Fax: 01865 267 985
    Email:
    Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Conlin, Michael & Orsini, Joe & Tang, Meng-Chi, 2013. "The effect of an agent’s expertise on National Football League contract structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 275-281.
    2. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.
    3. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    4. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:517-542. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.