Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known Impatience: A Theoretical and Experimental Study
AbstractWe analyze a durable-goods monopoly selling a single unit of a good to a buyer whose value of the good is private information. The discount factors of the buyer and the seller may differ and are also privately known. We derive the closed-form solution of a two-period game and compare it to the behavior observed in experiments. The data are to a large extent consistent with the predictions. (JEL C90, L12, C73) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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- Ralph-C Bayer, 2006.
"Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition,"
School of Economics Working Papers
2006-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Bayer, Ralph-C., 2010. "Intertemporal price discrimination and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 273-293, February.
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