As an alternative to market failure explanations, the authors draw on theory and historical evidence to argue that fiscal considerations explain the roles governments typically play in producing and regulating money. Public monopoly production of coins and banknotes, substitution of fiat for commodity standards, and restrictions on substitutes for government money all generate revenue and especially provide means for meeting fiscal emergencies. The authors argue that these arrangements do not reflect conscious design so much as the evolutionary survival of the fiscally advantageous. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 37 (1999) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 154-65 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:154-65
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