Attendance Rates, Political Shirking, and the Effect of Post-Elective Office Employment
AbstractMost economists agree that opportunistic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection. By implication, the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office. This paper seeks to learn whether shirking can be reduced when opportunities exist for political parties and/or constituencies to affect a shirking politician's postelective career or the careers of his children. Shirking is found to be completely eliminated only in the case where both the retiring congressman and his offspring continue to be employed in government and/or lobbying after the congressman leaves elective office. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 28 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1999. "What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 341-377, June.
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- Sutter, Daniel & Poitras, Marc, 2008. "Political hierarchies and political shirking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 334-356, February.
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