The Role of Training in Experimental Auctions
AbstractIn this paper we examine the role of providing extensive training to subjects in the context of experimental auctions. We conducted an experiment where we auctioned several lotteries with varying payoffs. One group of subjects was extensively trained while another group of subjects was only minimally trained. We find that subjects in the extensive training treatment, were submitting bids significantly higher than subjects in the minimal training treatment, suggesting that subjects without proper training may underreport their WTP.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 93 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
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- Teresa Briz & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr, 2014.
"Detecting false positives in experimental auctions: A case study of projection bias in food consumption,"
2014-4, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
- Briz, Teresa & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo M., 2014. "Detecting false positives in experimental auctions: A case study of projection bias in food consumption," MPRA Paper 57101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Corrigan, Jay R. & Rousu, Matthew C., 2011. "Do Practice Rounds Bias Experimental Auction Results?," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Corrigan, Jay R. & Rousu, Matthew C. & Depositario, Dinah Pura T., 2014. "Do practice rounds affect experimental auction results?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 42-44.
- Drichoutis, Andreas & Nayga, Rodolfo & Klonaris, Stathis, 2010. "The Effects of Induced Mood on Preference Reversals and Bidding Behavior in Experimental Auction Valuation," MPRA Paper 25597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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