Social Insurance of Short Spell Sickness
AbstractThis paper looks at social insurance of short term absence from work. The chief concern is with efficiency properties of full coverage. That arrangement is reviewed and criticized here in light of received theory. A main point is that positive loading of the premium implies less than full coverage. Concerns with optimal risk sharing also pull in the same direction. Besides, full coverage creates problems with moral hazard. The possibilities to self-insure over time are emphasized.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nopecjournal.org
risk sharing; coinsurance; deductible; non-insurable risk; Pareto efficiency; mutual insurance; arbitrage; adverse selection; moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999.
"Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-54, December.
- Skinner, Jonathan, 1988.
"Risky income, life cycle consumption, and precautionary savings,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 237-255, September.
- Jonathan S. Skinner, 1987. "Risky Income, Life Cycle Consumption, and Precautionary Savings," NBER Working Papers 2336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Halvor Mehlum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.