Decentralized Enforcement, Sequential Bargaining and the Clean Development Mechanism
AbstractWhile there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is Fearon (1998), who models international cooperation as a two-stage process, in which the bargaining process is constrained by a need for decentralized enforcement (meaning that the agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves, rather than a third party such as a court). Using the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol as an example, the present paper proposes a different model of this kind of interaction. This model follows Fearon's in so far as we both use the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma to capture the enforcement phase of the game. However, while Fearon depicts the bargaining stage as a War of Attrition, the present model sees that stage as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-Rubinstein type. The implications of the present model are compared both to those of the Ståhl-Rubenstein model and to those of the Fearon model. A surprising conclusion is that a need for decentralized enforcement tends to make the bargaining outcome more symmetrical than otherwise. Thus, the impact of bargaining power is actually smaller when the resulting agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves, than it is if enforcement is taken care of by a third party.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2001)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Powell, Robert, 1994. "Anarchy in international relations theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(02), pages 313-344, March.
- Cathrine Hagem, 1996. "Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(4), pages 431-447, December.
- A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004.
"North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information,"
Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
- Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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