This paper develops a model of pricing and dividend policies in open credit cooperatives (i.e., those doing member and nonmember business). For a fixed distribution of member preferences, the larger the fraction of business done by members, the smaller the optimal dividend and the larger the optimal pricing subsidy. For a fixed fraction of member business, the greater the skewness of member preferences toward loan (deposit)business with the credit cooperative, the larger the optimal dividend and the higher (lower) the optimal loan (deposit) interest rate. Aggregate empirical evidence from the German cooperative banking sector supports a version of the latter prediction.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
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William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, 1999.
"Credit unions and the common bond,"
Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 41-64.
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