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The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game - Note

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Author Info
Elias L. Khalil

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Abstract

HOLM [1995] claims that the prisoners' dilemma story is dubious: Each prisoner may confess even when innocent. However, this apparent failing can be remedied. The story is dubious rather because it is already institution-bound (the trust which binds the prisoners) and, therefore, its range is limited. An alternative, institution-free story is the 'Red Queen Paradox' from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. The Red Queen Paradox highlights the reason behind the familiar suboptimal outcome of competition. The reason ist not the lack of an enforcer but rather the character of property as non-exclusively owned which typifies competition.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 153 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 411-415
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199706)153:2_411:trqpap_2.0.tx_2-3

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Related research
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. William Baumol, 2002. "Towards microeconomics of innovation: Growth engine hallmark of market economics," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 1-12, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mark Koyama, 2008. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury' Complex Contracts and Segmented Capital Markets," Economics Series Working Papers 412, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Vaaler, Paul M. & McNamara, Gerry, 2006. "Are Technology-Intensive Industries More Dynamically Competitive? No and Yes," Working Papers 06-0124, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
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