The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game - Note
AbstractHOLM  claims that the prisoners' dilemma story is dubious: Each prisoner may confess even when innocent. However, this apparent failing can be remedied. The story is dubious rather because it is already institution-bound (the trust which binds the prisoners) and, therefore, its range is limited. An alternative, institution-free story is the 'Red Queen Paradox' from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. The Red Queen Paradox highlights the reason behind the familiar suboptimal outcome of competition. The reason ist not the lack of an enforcer but rather the character of property as non-exclusively owned which typifies competition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 153 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- The Entrepreneurial Economist and the Red Queen Game
by Paul in truck and barter on 2006-03-12 07:39:47
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