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Strategic choice of forward contracts and managerial incentive contracts in a context of Cournot competition

Author

Listed:
  • Sandra Miranda
  • Ximena Bernal
  • Flavio Jácome

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of forward contracts and managerial incentive contracts, which are tools that firms can use to compete strategically with their rivals in an oligopolistic market. The results show that when the two firms produce a homogeneous good, can hire managers and trade forward contracts, in equilibrium they hire managers and none of them negotiate forward contracts. In the case of differentiated goods, when the goods are substitutes, in equilibrium the firms hire managers and do not trade forward contracts; when the goods are complementary, one firm hires a manager and does not negotiate forward contracts whereas the other one does not hire a manager and negotiates forward contracts. The highest social welfare is achieved when the firms use managerial incentive contracts and forward contracts, and the lowest is achieved when the firms do not use these strategic tools. However, the equilibrium social welfare level is suboptimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Miranda & Ximena Bernal & Flavio Jácome, 2012. "Strategic choice of forward contracts and managerial incentive contracts in a context of Cournot competition," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 76, pages 215-257.
    • Handle: RePEc:lde:journl:y:2012:i:76:p:215-257
    as

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    File URL: https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/lecturasdeeconomia/issue/view/1203
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allaz Blaise & Vila Jean-Luc, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-16, February.
    2. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot competition; Nash equilibrium; forward contracts; managerial incentive contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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