During the 1990s, household public services in Colombia went through an important reform: the entrance of the private sector was allowed and users could participate in the surveillance and control of these services. However, given the collective dimension and monopolistic character of most of these services, it was necessary to introduce a series of institutional mechanisms that allowed the user to defend his wellbeing. This article analyzes, through the exit, voice, and loyalty model proposed by Albert O. Hirschman, the institutional developments, showing the advances and deficiencies of the system in this area. The voice option is emphasized as the only real defense of users regarding failures of the system and some reform proposals are presented
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Article provided by Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía in its journal LECTURAS DE ECONOMÍA.
Volume (Year): (2006) Issue (Month): 65 (Julio-Diciembre) Pages: 117-142 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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