Los servicios públicos domiciliarios en Colombia a la luz del modelo de Salida, voz y lealtad de Albert Hirschman
AbstractDuring the 1990s, household public services in Colombia went through an important reform: the entrance of the private sector was allowed and users could participate in the surveillance and control of these services. However, given the collective dimension and monopolistic character of most of these services, it was necessary to introduce a series of institutional mechanisms that allowed the user to defend his wellbeing. This article analyzes, through the exit, voice, and loyalty model proposed by Albert O. Hirschman, the institutional developments, showing the advances and deficiencies of the system in this area. The voice option is emphasized as the only real defense of users regarding failures of the system and some reform proposals are presented
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía in its journal LECTURAS DE ECONOMÍA.
Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): 65 (Julio-Diciembre)
Postal: Lecturas de Economía, Departamento de Economía, Calle 67, 53-108, Medellin 050010, Colombia.
Other versions of this item:
- Valencia, Germán, 2006. "Los servicios públicos domiciliarios en Colombia a la luz del modelo de Salida, voz y lealtad de Albert Hirschman," REVISTA LECTURAS DE ECONOMÍA, UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE.
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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