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Ownership Structure, independent directors and firm performance

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  • Basiru Salisu KALLAMU

    (Putra Business School, Malaysia.)

Abstract

The paper examined the moderating role of independent directors in the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Using a sample of 37 finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 2011, the result indicates a significant positive moderating effect of independent directors in the relationship between director ownership and ROA but a negative relationship based on Tobin’s Q. The result means that in a company where directors have controlling shares, having independent directors on the board will enhance performance since there will be alignment of interest of board and shareholders. On the other hand, the independent directors influence firm performance negatively in firms with majority ownership by directors since the directors who are the majority shareholders will promote their interest over the interest of the shareholders. The study has provided evidence on the moderating role of independent directors in the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. This suggests that independent directors influence the strength and direction of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Basiru Salisu KALLAMU, 2016. "Ownership Structure, independent directors and firm performance," Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, KSP Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 17-30, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksp:journ4:v:3:y:2016:i:1:p:17-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Suzuki Yasushi & Hasan A K M Kamrul, 2018. "An Analysis of Codified Corporate Governance Practices in the Banking Industry: The Case Study of Bangladesh," Financial Internet Quarterly (formerly e-Finanse), Sciendo, vol. 14(3), pages 60-75, September.
    2. Prageeth Roshan Weerathunga & Chen Xiaofang & Manoj Samarathunga, 2019. "Firm-specific and Contextual Determinants of Sri Lankan Corporate Hotel Performance," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 9(3), pages 213-224.
    3. Achraf Haddad, 2022. "Effect of board quality on the financial performance of conventional and Islamic banks: international comparative study after the Subprime crisis," Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 13(2), pages 399-449, June.
    4. Md. Kamrul Islam & Sugandha Mobin Sharna, 2022. "Do board characteristics affect financial performance of firms? An empirical study on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) listed Insurance Companies of Bangladesh," International Journal of Science and Business, IJSAB International, vol. 14(1), pages 1-10.
    5. Hassan, Ismaila & Hassan Alhaji, Tanko, 2023. "Ownership Structure and Financial Performance of Listed Insurance Firms in Nigeria: Moderating Role of Independent Director," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 7(5), pages 1833-1840, May.
    6. Chiu-Hui Wu, 2021. "On the Moderating Effects of Country Governance on the Relationships between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-13, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership structure; board of directors; independent directors; firm performance; moderating variable.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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