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Menedzserösztönzők hatása a vállalati fedezésre
[Manager incentives-based model of corporate hedging]

Author

Listed:
  • Dömötör, Barbara
  • Bihary, Zsolt

Abstract

A vállalati fedezési szokások magyarázatára szolgáló modellünkben az optimális fedezeti arány egy kétkomponensű hasznosság maximalizálásából vezethető le. A teljes vállalati hasznosság mellett a célfüggvényben megjelenik a pénzügyi vezető azon várakozása is, hogy fedezeti döntését utólagosan nem a teljes, hanem csak a pénzügyi eredmény alapján ítélik meg. Ha a menedzser biztos lehet abban, hogy bónusza a teljes vállalati eredménytől függ, akkor más ösztönzők hiányában a modellünkből levezethető optimális fedezeti arány megegyezik a szakirodalom klasszikus modelljeinek eredményével. Ha viszont a pénzügyi vezető arra számít, hogy fedezési döntésének utólagos megítélése kizárólag a pénzügyi eredményen alapul, az optimális kockázatkerülő döntése az lesz, hogy egyáltalán nem fedez. E két, ellentétes irányú komponens súlyának függvényében alakul az optimális fedezeti arány. Elméleti modellünk empirikus megerősítéséhez a magyar nagyvállalatok fedezési gyakorlatát vizsgáltuk. A rendelkezésre álló minta kis mérete miatt az eredmény nem lett szignifikáns, azonban megfelel az elméleti modell alapján vártnak.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: G13, G32, G34.

Suggested Citation

  • Dömötör, Barbara & Bihary, Zsolt, 2018. "Menedzserösztönzők hatása a vállalati fedezésre [Manager incentives-based model of corporate hedging]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 701-710.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1783
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2018.7-8.701
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    7. Argyro Panaretou & Mark B. Shackleton & Paul A Taylor, 2013. "Corporate Risk Management and Hedge Accounting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 116-139, March.
    8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    9. Rolfo, Jacques, 1980. "Optimal Hedging under Price and Quantity Uncertainty: The Case of a Cocoa Producer," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 100-116, February.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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