Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees
AbstractIn many countries, loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). If loan guarantee schemes are to be effective, a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources: a property known as incrementality or additionality. This paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality. This work uses a two-stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the Canada Small Business Financing (CSBF) program. First, a logistic regression-based model of loan outcomes (essentially a credit-scoring model) is estimated based on a large representative sample of SMEs. The resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness-of-fit. The model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme. Incremental loans ought to be classified as “turndowns” by the model; hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality. For the CSBF loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated (with 95% confidence) as 74.8±9.0%. Copyright Springer 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100338
additionality; incrementality; small business; loan guarantees; G18; G28; M13; O17;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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