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Small Firms and Formality: The Influence of Judicial Efficiency and Regulation Costs

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  • Jeffrey Nugent
  • Grigor Sukiassyan

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  • Jeffrey Nugent & Grigor Sukiassyan, 2009. "Small Firms and Formality: The Influence of Judicial Efficiency and Regulation Costs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(4), pages 349-371, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:34:y:2009:i:4:p:349-371
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9213-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    2. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    3. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1335-1356, December.
    4. McKenzie, David J & Woodruff, Christopher, 2006. "Do Entry Costs Provide an Empirical Basis for Poverty Traps? Evidence from Mexican Microenterprises," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 3-42, October.
    5. Luc Laeven & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 601-614, November.
    6. McPherson, Michael A. & Liedholm, Carl, 1996. "Determinants of small and micro enterprise registration: Results from surveys in Niger and Swaziland," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 481-487, March.
    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    8. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-670, May.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    10. Levenson, Alec R. & Maloney, William F., 1998. "The informal sector, firm dynamics, and institutional participation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1988, The World Bank.
    11. Cunningham, Wendy V & Maloney, William F, 2001. "Heterogeneity among Mexico's Microenterprises: An Application of Factor and Cluster Analysis," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 131-156, October.
    12. Fausto Hernández‐Trillo & José A. Pagán & Julia Paxton, 2005. "Start‐up Capital, Microenterprises and Technical Efficiency in Mexico," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 434-447, August.
    13. Fajnzylber, Pablo & Maloney, William F. & Rojas, Gabriel V. Montes, 2006. "Releasing constraints to growth or pushing on a string ? the impact of credit, training, business associations, and taxes on the performance of Mexican micro-firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3807, The World Bank.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation costs; Contract enforcement; Efficiency of the legal system; Microenterprise; Mexico; D21; D63; L1; O12; O17;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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