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Favorites and Underdogs: Strategic Behavior in an Experimental Contest

Author

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  • Shogren, Jason F
  • Baik, Kyung H

Abstract

Conflicts between favorites and underdogs are everyday phenomena. The authors examine their strategic behavior in an experimental contest and find behavior partially consistent with predictions. Favorites given a first-mover advantage do overcommit effort relative to Nash. Underdogs often select the best response effort level given the favorite's move. Overall dissipation of the prize was significantly higher with the strategic commitment relative to Nash. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Shogren, Jason F & Baik, Kyung H, 1992. "Favorites and Underdogs: Strategic Behavior in an Experimental Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 191-205, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:74:y:1992:i:2:p:191-205
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    2. Stracke, Rudi & Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Competing for Market Shares: Why the Order of Moves Matters Even When It Shouldn't," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145532, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," MPRA Paper 89327, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Sherrill Shaffer & Jason Shogren, 2008. "Infinitely repeated contests: How strategic interaction affects the efficiency of governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(2), pages 234-252, June.
    5. Holt, Todd Sanders, 1992. "Timing theory in contests with experimental evidence," ISU General Staff Papers 1992010108000017574, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal Adaption to Dominant Environments," CESifo Working Paper Series 3157, CESifo.
    7. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-83, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    8. Kyung Hwan Baik & Shogren, Jason F., 1995. "Contests with spying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 441-451, September.
    9. Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
    10. Jason Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 1991. "Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 195-214, June.
    11. Shaffer, Sherrill & Shogren, Jason F., 2009. "Repeated contests: A general parameterization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 159-161, November.
    12. Kyung Hwan Baik & Todd Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Jason Shogren, 1999. "Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, August.
    13. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Shakun D. Mago, 2023. "Contests with revisions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(4), pages 915-954, September.

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