IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v48y1986i1p71-79.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Richards

Abstract

In sum, the cost environment in which PACs operate will directly influence both their behavior and their ability to ‘buy’ political benefits. Recognition of these effects implies that the conclusions of earlier studies that different PACs follow inherently different strategies, or that PACs are not rational in their contributory allocations are premature, and indeed, insupportable in the absence of cost analysis. Attention to costs also suggests that some important econometric problems may attend the investigation of PAC behavior. The real lesson to learn, however, is not that there are a number of pitfalls in past or perhaps future research. Rather, the key point is the need for an analysis of the cost side of political participation. Such work is necessary if a satisfactory model of PAC behavior is to be developed. Moreover, it would constitute an important step in building a general equilibrium model of policy outcomes in which the level of political activity is itself endogenous. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Richards, 1986. "A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 71-79, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:48:y:1986:i:1:p:71-79
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00239562
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00239562
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00239562?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bailey, Elizabeth E & Friedlaender, Ann F, 1982. "Market Structure and Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 1024-1048, September.
    2. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
    3. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
    4. James Kau & Paul Rubin, 1984. "Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 385-388, January.
    5. Jonathan Silberman & Gilbert Yochum, 1980. "The market for special interest campaign funds: An exploratory approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 75-83, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Munger, 1988. "On the political participation of the firm in the electoral process: An update," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 295-298, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    2. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    3. Freille, Sebastián, 2015. "Do private campaing contributions affect electoral results? An examination of Argentine national elections," MPRA Paper 65455, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Abler, David G., 1989. "Campaign Contributions And Voting On Farm Legislation," 1989 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 2, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 270523, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Stratmann, Thomas, 1996. "How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 603-635, October.
    6. Al Wilhite, 1988. "Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 259-268, September.
    7. de Gorter, Harry & Rausser, Gordon C., 1989. "Endogenizing U.S. milk price supports," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4f58t530, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    8. Kevin Henrickson & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Voting, Regulation, and the Railroad Industry: An Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(1), pages 21-39, August.
    9. Brooks, Jonathan, 1997. "Congressional Voting On Farm Payment Limitations: Political Pressure Of Ideological Conviction?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-15, December.
    10. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    11. Allen Wilhite & John Theilmann, 1987. "Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: A simultaneous logit approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 267-276, January.
    12. Riddel, Mary, 2003. "Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 177-194, March.
    13. John H. Goddeeris, 1989. "Modeling Interest-Group Campaign Contributions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 17(2), pages 158-184, April.
    14. Bai, Y., 2015. "Essays in empirical banking," Other publications TiSEM 1dfac126-8206-4aca-a15d-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Barbosa, Klenio, 2009. "Free Riding in Procurement Design," TSE Working Papers 09-128, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    16. Bottasso, Anna & Conti, Maurizio & Vannoni, Davide, 2019. "Scale and (quasi) scope economies in airport technology. An application to UK airports," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 150-164.
    17. Timothy M. Shaughnessy, 2005. "A Preliminary Analysis of Campaign Contributions in Florida's Legislative and Judicial Elections," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 20(Spring 20), pages 43-67.
    18. Oren M. Levin-Waldman, 1996. "Exploring the Politics of the Minimum Wage," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_176, Levy Economics Institute.
    19. Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 080926, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    20. Rausser, Gordon C. & de Gorter, Harry, 1988. "Endogenizing Policy In Models Of Agricultural Markets," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270460, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:48:y:1986:i:1:p:71-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.