Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform
AbstractWe analyze the effect of different legislature size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a large and significantly positive effect of the number of legislators. We use these findings to forecast the effects of the increase in the number of legislators that is taking place in some regions: a 10% increase in legislature size commands on average a 12% increase in per capita regional expenditure. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 131 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Legislature size; Regional expenditure;
Other versions of this item:
- Fiorino, Nadia & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2006. "Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: forecasting the effects of a reform," POLIS Working Papers 69, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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