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Note on Excess Capacity in a Monopoly Market with Network Externalities

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  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

    (Kwansei Gakuin University)

Abstract

Using a capacity-then-production choice model, we consider whether excess capacity results hold, when there is one provider, i.e., a monopoly or a public firm, in a network product and service market. In the case of a monopoly, if consumers form expectations of network sizes after (before) a capacity-scale decision, the capacity scale is larger than (equal to) the production quantity. Thus, excess capacity results hold (do not hold). Furthermore, in the case of a public firm, excess capacity results do not hold, irrespective of the timing of consumer expectations. However, this result depends on the specification of the utility function.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2021. "Note on Excess Capacity in a Monopoly Market with Network Externalities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 411-422, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:21:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10842-021-00363-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-021-00363-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumer expectation; Capacity-then-production choice; Network externality; Monopoly; Public firm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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