Why is there Corporate Taxation? The Role of Limited Liability Revisited
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 92 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
corporate taxation; limited liability; H21; H25;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May.
- Jack Mintz, 1995. "Corporation tax: a survey," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 23-68, November.
- A. Miglo, 2007.
"A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 11-19, September.
- Anton Miglo, 2007. "A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information," Working Papers 0704, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Ralf Ewert & Rainer Niemann, 2010. "Limited Liability, Asymmetric Taxation, and Risk Taking - Why Partial Tax Neutralities can be Harmful," CESifo Working Paper Series 3301, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dreßler, Daniel, 2012. "Form follows function? Evidence on tax savings by multinational holding structures," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-057, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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