This paper concerns the consequences of subsidizing art production. Once a government offers grants and subsidies, artists can decide between public and private funding. A joint model of this choice-situation and the related earnings is derived. The model is tested for the case of visual artists in the Netherlands. The analyses show that subsidizing artists enhances a winner-takes-all tendency for the market at large. Financial success on both the private and the public market appears to be not particularly related to human capital, but to personal characteristics, government recognition and (unobserved) talents. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
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