The Taxation of Banking in an Integrating Europe
AbstractThe banking sector is subject to explicit taxation and to bank regulation and supervision with quasi-fiscal implications. The assignment of national fiscal policy rights and duties regarding international banks in the EU varies with the fiscal instrument and with whether the international bank owns foreign branches or subsidiaries. Decentralized national policy-making in the EU gives rise to fiscal burdens on banks that differ internationally and with the national origin of banks in the same country. This paper discusses the international aspects of the overall fiscal regime facing banks in the EU and it evaluates some avenues for reform.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 11 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
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