Self-Selection and Optimal Nonlinear Effluent Charges
AbstractThis paper proposes an optimal nonlinear effluent-charge system forenvironmental pollution control. This system achieves the first-bestoptimum through a self-selecting mechanism under asymmetric information.The proposed system can also control the level of revenues so as to reducethe excess burden of environmental taxation, and discriminate among thepolluters. The paper also compares this system with the conventional lineareffluent-charge system and discusses some economic implications ofimplementing the system. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
asymmetric information; nonlinear effluent charges; self-selection;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Srinagesh, P. & Bradburd, R.M., 1988.
"Quality Distorsion By A Discriminating Monopolist,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
117, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1997.
"Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividends Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?,"
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
9706, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1997. "Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?," NBER Working Papers 6199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fullerton, Don, 1997. "Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxes: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 245-51, March.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Don Fullerton & Andrew Leicester & Stephen Smith, 2008. "Environmental Taxes," NBER Working Papers 14197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bovenberg, A.L. & Mooij, R.A. de, 1994.
"Environmental levies and distortionary taxation,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152985, Tilburg University.
- Parry Ian W. H., 1995. "Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S64-S77, November.
- Lee, Dwight R. & Misiolek, Walter S., 1986. "Substituting pollution taxation for general taxation: Some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 338-347, December.
- Terkla, David, 1984. "The efficiency value of effluent tax revenues," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 107-123, June.
- Yochanan Shachmurove & Reuel Shinnar (Deceased), 2012. "Do Chemical Reactors Hold the Solution for Global Economic Crises?," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.