European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement
AbstractThis paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbinâSachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.
Volume (Year): 31 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261
Monetary policy; fiscal policy; monetary union; EU; EMU;
Other versions of this item:
- Reinhard Neck & GOTTFRIED Haber & WARWICK Mckibbin, 2004. "European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 229-245, June.
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- Reinhard Neck & Robert Holzmann, 2002. "Editorial: European Monetary and Fiscal Policies: Myths and Facts," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 181-182, September.
- Reinhard Neck & Gottfried Haber & Warwick McKIBBIN, 1999. "Macroeconomic Policy Design in the European Monetary Union: A Numerical Game Approach," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 319-335, December.
- Reinhard Reinhard & Gottfried Haber & Warwick McKibbin, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 225-244, September.
- Warwick J. McKibbin, 2002. "Macroeconomic Policy in Japan," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 1(2), pages 133-165.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 169-170, September.
- André Sapir & Marco Buti, 1998. "Economic policy in EMU," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8078, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Gottfried Haber & Reinhard Neck & Warwick McKibbin, 2002. "Global Implications of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 363-379, October.
- Reinhard Neck & Gottfried Haber, 2006. "Macroeconomic policy and EMU enlargement," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 17-21, December.
- Gottfried Haber & Reinhard Neck, 2005. "Shall the New EU Members Introduce the Euro? Some Macroeconomic Policy Effects," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 33(2), pages 139-149, June.
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