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Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison

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  • Sophie Harnay
  • Alain Marciano

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  • Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, 2011. "Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 293-304, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:293-304
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2003. "Damage averaging and the formation of class action suits," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 63-74, March.
    2. Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 205-224, October.
    3. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
    4. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2004. "Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(1), pages 27-78, March.
    5. Bailey, Martin J. & Rubin, Paul H., 1994. "A positive theory of legal change," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 467-477, December.
    6. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    7. Marta Cenini & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 229-240, October.
    8. Haymond, Jeffrey & West, James E, 2003. "Class Action Extraction?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 91-108, July.
    9. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 1999. "Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 379-396, Springer.
    10. Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August.
    11. Vicary, Simon, 1997. "Joint production and the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 429-445, February.
    12. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    13. Paul Rubin, 2005. "Public choice and tort reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 223-236, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 205-224, October.
    2. Juergen Backhaus & Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The law and economics of class actions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 165-168, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Class action; Collective litigation; Rent-seeking; Free rider problem; Political market; K41; H41; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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