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The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making

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  • Torsten Selck

Abstract

Game-theoretic models of political decision-making regard policy outcomes as a combined result of actor preferences and institutions. This paper explores the effects of adding relative issue salience to the analysis. I focus on non-cooperative models of complete and perfect information that are based on the concept of structure-induced equilibrium (Shepsle in Am J Polit Sci 23(1):27–59, 1979). Assuming a progressive agenda-setter and two conservative voters, I show how a change of the relative issue salience for players in a game results in a different equilibrium outcome in a political decision-making body. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Torsten Selck, 2006. "The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 5-13, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:1:p:5-13
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph Kadane, 1972. "On division of the question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-54, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decision-making; Game theory; Structure-induced equilibrium; Issue salience; C72; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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