Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis
AbstractUsing time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by “economic freedom” from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional “political institutions” are proxied by variables from the Database of Political Institutions. Our results suggest that the more credible the threat of removal from office, the more government officials will pursue efficient economic policies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
good governance; economic freedom; principal-agent; political institutions; constitutions; D72; D78; H11; O57;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
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- Jakob De Haan & Susanna Lundström & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006.
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- Francois Facchini, 2010. "Religion, law and development: Islam and Christianity—Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that man invented the institutions of freedom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 103-129, February.
- Vatcharin Sirimaneetham, 2006. "What drives liberal policies in developing countries?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/587, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Antonio Saravia, 2008. "A note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedom," Development Research Working Paper Series 07/2008, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
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