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Investment, agency conflicts, debt maturity, and loan guarantees by negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • Liu Gan

    (Hunan University of Commerce)

  • Zhaojun Yang

    (Southern University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu Gan & Zhaojun Yang, 2017. "Investment, agency conflicts, debt maturity, and loan guarantees by negotiation," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 253-271, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:13:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10436-017-0298-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-017-0298-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Pengfei & Chen, Biao & Liu, Fengjun, 2020. "Growth option, debt maturity and cash reserves with bank-tax-interaction," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real options; Loan guarantees; Debt maturity; Negotiation; Agency conflicts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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