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A Dynamic Nash Game Model of Oil Market Disruption and Strategic Stockpiling

Author

Listed:
  • Frederic H. Murphy

    (Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

  • Michael A. Toman

    (Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.)

  • Howard J. Weiss

    (Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

Abstract

In this paper we present and analyze a Nash dynamic game model for investigating public and private sector oil inventory policies in unstable world oil markets. Conceptual results about the model include simple, verifiable conditions for uniqueness and stability of solutions, along with characterizations of optimal policies. We also present results and discuss computational issues that arise in determining subgame perfect infinite-horizon equilibria, using a steady-state policy iteration approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic H. Murphy & Michael A. Toman & Howard J. Weiss, 1989. "A Dynamic Nash Game Model of Oil Market Disruption and Strategic Stockpiling," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(6), pages 958-971, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:37:y:1989:i:6:p:958-971
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.37.6.958
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Huanan Li & Xin Chen, 2016. "Dynamic game analysis on China’s public and private oil stockpiles," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 84(1), pages 715-723, October.
    2. Murphy, Frederic & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2010. "Developing a market-based approach to managing the US strategic petroleum reserve," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 206(2), pages 488-495, October.
    3. Murphy, Frederic & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2013. "Pricing option contracts on the strategic petroleum reserve," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 242-250.
    4. Matthew Sobel, 2013. "Discounting axioms imply risk neutrality," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 208(1), pages 417-432, September.
    5. Bai, Y. & Zhou, D.Q. & Zhou, P. & Zhang, L.B., 2012. "Optimal path for China's strategic petroleum reserve: A dynamic programming analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1058-1063.
    6. Zhang, Xiao-Bing & Qin, Ping & Chen, Xiaolan, 2017. "Strategic oil stockpiling for energy security: The case of China and India," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 253-260.
    7. Xie, Nan & Yan, Zhijun & Zhou, Yi & Huang, Wenjun, 2017. "China's optimal stockpiling policies in the context of new oil price trend," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 332-340.
    8. Fan, Ying & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2010. "Modelling the strategic petroleum reserves of China and India by a stochastic dynamic game," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 505-519, July.
    9. Zhang, Zhimin & Elshkaki, Ayman, 2022. "An analysis of the supply-side factors of geological exploration in China based on provincial panel data between 1999 and 2017," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    10. Wu, Gang & Fan, Ying & Liu, Lan-Cui & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2008. "An empirical analysis of the dynamic programming model of stockpile acquisition strategies for China's strategic petroleum reserve," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1470-1478, April.
    11. Bai, Yang & Dahl, Carol, 2018. "Evaluating the management of U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve during oil disruptions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 25-38.
    12. Zhang, Xiao-Bing & Zheng, Xinye & Qin, Ping & Xie, Lunyu, 2018. "Oil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 255-262.
    13. Chen, Xin & Mu, Hailin & Li, Huanan & Gui, Shusen, 2014. "Using stockpile delegation to improve China׳s strategic oil policy: A multi-dimension stochastic dynamic programming approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 28-42.
    14. Wu, Gang & Wei, Yi-Ming & Nielsen, Chris & Lu, Xi & McElroy, Michael B., 2012. "A dynamic programming model of China's strategic petroleum reserve: General strategy and the effect of emergencies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1234-1243.
    15. Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2014. "Optimal strategic oil stockpiling and import tariffs: The case of China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 463-474.

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