Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

When Is Price Discrimination Profitable?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric T. Anderson

    ()
    (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208)

  • James D. Dana, Jr.

    ()
    (Department of Economics and College of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115)

Abstract

We consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable. We show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus (i.e., consumers' total willingness to pay, less the firm's costs) associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers' willingness to pay. We refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing, economics, and operations management literatures.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0979
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

Volume (Year): 55 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (June)
Pages: 980-989

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:55:y:2009:i:6:p:980-989

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 7240 Parkway Drive, Suite 300, Hanover, MD 21076 USA
Phone: +1-443-757-3500
Fax: 443-757-3515
Email:
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: marketing; pricing; segmentation; economics; econometrics; price discrimination; segmented pricing; product line;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Calzada, Joan & Valletti, Tommaso, 2011. "Intertemporal movie distribution: Versioning when customers can buy both versions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dana Jr., James D. & Yahalom, Tomer, 2008. "Price discrimination with a resource constraint," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 330-332, September.
  3. Zhang, Jie & Savage, Scott & Chen, Yongmin, 2011. "Consumer uncertainty and price discrimination through online coupons: an empirical study of restaurants in Shanghai," MPRA Paper 34583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Kutsal Dogan & Ernan Haruvy & Ram Rao, 2010. "Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 61-90, March.
  5. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2011. "Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 1540, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Sun, Ching-jen, 2007. "Dynamic Price Discrimination and Quality Provision Based on Purchase History," MPRA Paper 9855, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2008.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:55:y:2009:i:6:p:980-989. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.