IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v49y2003i8p1003-1017.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Yuval Deutsch

    (Schulich School of Business, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3)

  • Thomas W. Ross

    (Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z2)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop an analytical model of outside directors' signaling role---a role that is especially important for entrepreneurial firms. We formally demonstrate that in the face of a market failure in which stakeholders refuse to align themselves with new firms, high-quality new ventures may be able to credibly signal their type by appointing reputable directors to their boards. However, this option is not universally feasible. Both directors' reputations and the quality of their information determine the effectiveness of this strategy. In contrast to earlier adverse selection models, we demonstrate that when the middlemen (directors) have incomplete information on firm quality, bad and good firms can coexist in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the quality of the directors' information determines the mix of good and bad firms in the population of surviving firms. Avenues for future research and normative implications for practitioners are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuval Deutsch & Thomas W. Ross, 2003. "You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1003-1017, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:49:y:2003:i:8:p:1003-1017
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tinic, Seha M, 1988. " Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(4), pages 789-822, September.
    2. Raphael Amit & Lawrence Glosten & Eitan Muller, 1993. "Challenges To Theory Development In Entrepreneurship Research," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 815-834, September.
    3. Carter, Richard B & Manaster, Steven, 1990. "Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1045-1067, September.
    4. Datar, Srikant M. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Hughes, John S., 1991. "The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-49, March.
    5. Todd A. Finkle, 1998. "The Relationship between Boards of Directors and Initial Public Offerings in the Biotechnology Industry," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 22(3), pages 5-29, April.
    6. Daily, Catherine M. & Dalton, Dan R., 1992. "The relationship between governance structure and corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 7(5), pages 375-386, September.
    7. Amit, Raphael & Brander, James & Zott, Christoph, 1998. "Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 441-466, November.
    8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    9. Keith Weigelt & Colin Camerer, 1988. "Reputation and corporate strategy: A review of recent theory and applications," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(5), pages 443-454, September.
    10. S. Trevis Certo & Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 2001. "Signaling Firm Value through Board Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 26(2), pages 33-50, December.
    11. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-450, June.
    12. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    13. Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1993. "Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 17(3), pages 65-81, April.
    14. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    15. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    16. Raphael Amit & Lawrence Glosten & Eitan Muller, 1990. "Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(10), pages 1233-1246, October.
    17. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean Bédard & Daniel Coulombe & Lucie Courteau, 2008. "Audit Committee, Underpricing of IPOs, and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 519-535, November.
    2. David Williams & W. Duncan & Peter Ginter, 2010. "Testing a model of signals in the IPO offer process," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 445-463, May.
    3. S. Trevis Certo & Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 2001. "Signaling Firm Value through Board Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 26(2), pages 33-50, December.
    4. Jonas Gabrielsson, 2007. "Correlates of Board Empowerment in Small Companies," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 31(5), pages 687-711, September.
    5. Ng, Desmond W. & Salin, Victoria, 2012. "An Institutional Approach to the Examination of Food Safety," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 15(2), pages 1-26, May.
    6. Mohammadi, Ali & Shafizadeh, Mohammadmehdi & Johan, Sofia, 2014. "A Signaling Theory Of Entrepreneurial Venture’S Valuation: Evidence From Early Termination Of Venture Capital Investment," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 349, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    7. Fariss–Terry Mousa & Richard Reed, 2013. "The Impact of Slack Resources on High–Tech IPOs," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 37(5), pages 1123-1147, September.
    8. Rekha Handa & Balwinder Singh, 2017. "Performance of Indian IPOs: An Empirical Analysis," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 18(3), pages 734-749, June.
    9. Marc T. Junkunc & Jonathan T. Eckhardt, 2009. "Technical Specialized Knowledge and Secondary Shares in Initial Public Offerings," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(10), pages 1670-1687, October.
    10. Li, Yong & Aguilera, Ruth V., 2008. "Target Director Turnover in Acquisitions: A Conceptual Framework," Working Papers 08-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    11. Ahrens, Jan-Philipp & Uhlaner, Lorraine & Woywode, Michael & Zybura, Jan, 2018. "“Shadow emperor” or “loyal paladin”? – The Janus face of previous owner involvement in family firm successions," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 73-90.
    12. Tirthankar Nag & Chanchal Chatterjee, 2020. "Exploring Linkages Between Corporate Governance and Business Performance: Does Good Corporate Governance Lead to Enhanced Business Value?," South Asian Survey, , vol. 27(1), pages 37-61, March.
    13. RAMDANI, Dendi & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Board independence, CEO duality and firm performance: A quantile regression analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand," Working Papers 2009004, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    14. Yong Li & Ruth V. Aguilera, 2008. "Target Director Turnover in Acquisitions: A Conceptual Framework," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 492-503, November.
    15. Sheela Sundarasen & Kamilah Kamaludin & Izani Ibrahim & Usha Rajagopalan & Nevi Danila, 2021. "Auditors, Underwriters, and Firm Owners’ Interaction in an IPO Environment: The Case of OECD Nations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-13, June.
    16. Balboa, Marina & Marti, Jose, 2007. "Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 453-480, July.
    17. Nischay Arora & Balwinder Singh, 2019. "Impact of Auditor and Underwriter Reputation on Underpricing of SME IPOs in India," Management and Labour Studies, XLRI Jamshedpur, School of Business Management & Human Resources, vol. 44(2), pages 193-208, May.
    18. Catherine M. Daily & S. Trevis Certo & Dan R. Dalton & Rungpen Roengpitya, 2003. "IPO Underpricing: A Meta–Analysis and Research Synthesis," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 27(3), pages 271-295, July.
    19. Mouri, Nacef & Sarkar, M.B. & Frye, Melissa, 2012. "Alliance portfolios and shareholder value in post-IPO firms: The moderating roles of portfolio structure and firm-level uncertainty," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 355-371.
    20. Wu, Chloe Yu-Hsuan & Hsu, Hwa-Hsien, 2018. "Founders and board structure: Evidence from UK IPO firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 19-31.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:49:y:2003:i:8:p:1003-1017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.