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Bidding for Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • William Samuelson

    (School of Management, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215)

Abstract

In a competitive procurement, a buyer seeks to institute a bidding and contracting procedure which selects the most efficient firm to undertake the contract while offering terms that promote risk sharing between buyer and contractor. This paper develops a model to analyze formally the trade-off between the objectives of risk sharing and efficient contractor selection.

Suggested Citation

  • William Samuelson, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1533-1550, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:12:p:1533-1550
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.32.12.1533
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Du, Li & Hu, Qiying & Liu, Liming, 2006. "A profit sharing scheme for a two-firm joint venture," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 170(1), pages 277-292, April.
    2. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    3. Lansdowne, Z. F., 1996. "Extensions of bidding theory: Concealed bidding, optimal number of bidders, and follow-on contracts," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-114, February.
    4. Shi Chen & Hau Lee, 2017. "Incentive Alignment and Coordination of Project Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1011-1025, April.
    5. Martin, Stephen & Scott, John T., 2000. "The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support for private innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 437-447, April.
    6. Zhang, Juliang & Xiang, Jie & Cheng, T.C. Edwin & Hua, Guowei & Chen, Cheng, 2019. "An optimal efficient multi-attribute auction for transportation procurement with carriers having multi-unit supplies," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 249-260.
    7. Lajili, Kaouthar & Barry, Peter J. & Sonka, Steven T. & Mahoney, Joseph T., 1997. "Farmers' Preferences For Crop Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-17, December.
    8. Ward, S. C. & Chapman, C. B., 1995. "Evaluating fixed price incentive contracts," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 49-62, February.
    9. Gugler, Klaus & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2015. "Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 35-57.
    10. Link, Albert N. & Scott, John T., 2001. "Public/private partnerships: stimulating competition in a dynamic market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 763-794, April.
    11. De Liu & Jianqing Chen & Andrew B. Whinston, 2010. "Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 133-153, March.
    12. Liu, Shulin & Li, Jun & Liu, De, 2012. "Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 408-411.
    13. Anatolitis, Vasilios & Welisch, Marijke, 2017. "Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 394-402.
    14. Fieseler, Karsten, 1997. "Bidding for unit-price contracts : how craftsmen should bid," Papers 97-03, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    15. Katzman, Brett & Reif, Julian & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2010. "The relation between variance and information rent in auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 127-130, March.
    16. Paul, Anand & Gutierrez, Genaro, 2005. "Simple probability models for project contracting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(2), pages 329-338, September.
    17. Geoffrey Black, 2002. "A transaction cost model of contract choice: The case of petroleum exploration," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 8(3), pages 235-247, August.

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