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Securing Gates of a Protected Area: A Hybrid Game and Queueing Theory Modeling Approach

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  • Yael Deutsch

    (Department of Management, Bar-Ilan University, 5290002 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

  • Boaz Golany

    (Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, 3200003 Haifa, Israel)

Abstract

The prevention of malicious attacks on secured areas, such as airports and government installations, is a major concern everywhere as terror organizations increase their global reach. Typically, traffic in and out of such protected areas happens through well-defined gates. An attacker who wants to penetrate the area has to do it through one of the gates, and the defender who protects the area tries to prevent it by inspecting the incoming traffic. The trade-off faced by the defender is that increased inspections adversely affect the vast majority of innocent people passing through the gates by causing longer queues and discomfort. We combine game theory considerations with queueing theory analysis to address such situations. We formulate and analytically solve a defender–attacker game that takes place at multiple gates of a secured area. The gates are modeled as M / M / N queueing systems, where the “N” s are chosen strategically by the defender and may vary among the gates. Our analysis shows scenarios where even a limited number of guards is sufficient to deter would-be attackers and there is no need to assign additional guards even if they are available at no further cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2019. "Securing Gates of a Protected Area: A Hybrid Game and Queueing Theory Modeling Approach," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 31-45, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:16:y:2019:i:1:p:31-45
    DOI: 10.1287/deca.2018.0375
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cen Song & Jun Zhuang, 2017. "Two-stage security screening strategies in the face of strategic applicants, congestions and screening errors," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 258(2), pages 237-262, November.
    2. Deutsch, Yael & Golany, Boaz & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2011. "Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(2), pages 422-430, December.
    3. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2016. "Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 7-26, February.
    4. Naraphorn Haphuriwat & Vicki M. Bier & Henry H. Willis, 2011. "Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 88-102, June.
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    8. E. Boros & L. Fedzhora & P. B. Kantor & K. Saeger & P. Stroud, 2009. "A large‐scale linear programming model for finding optimal container inspection strategies," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(5), pages 404-420, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicki M. Bier & Simon French, 2020. "From the Editors: Decision Analysis Focus and Trends," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(1), pages 1-8, March.

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