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Short-Term Performance, Asymmetric Information And Inefficient Corporate Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Fernández Ruiz

    (El Colegio de México, A. C.)

Abstract

En este artículo se analiza un modelo en el que una empresa obtiene financiamiento en condiciones de información asimétrica. El desempeño de corto plazo de la empresa puede mitigar este problema de selección adversa, pero a costa de dar incentivos para llevar a cabo acciones ineficientes. Se estudia el comportamiento de equilibrio que resulta de la interacción de estos dos efectos.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Fernández Ruiz, 2002. "Short-Term Performance, Asymmetric Information And Inefficient Corporate Decisions," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 1(2), pages 119-129, Junio 200.
    • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:1:y:2002:i:2:p:119-129
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    File URL: http://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/primera/article/view/128
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
    2. Webb, David C, 1993. " The Trade-Off between Cash Flow and Net Present Value," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(1), pages 65-75.
    3. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 557-575.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond, 1991. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 709-737.
    5. Garvey, Gerald T & Grant, Simon & King, Stephen P, 1999. "Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 231-250, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Short-term signals; adverse selection;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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