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A New Measure of Central Bank Transparency and Implications for the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy

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  • Miguel Acosta

    (Federal Reserve Board)

Abstract

Transparency has been posited as a channel through which monetary policy is made more effective. However, empirical studies of this question and other questions concerning the role of transparency have lacked access to a time-varying highfrequency measure of transparency. This paper presents a new measure of the transparency of Federal Reserve deliberations, derived from the documents that the Fed uses to record and summarize each of its meetings. The measure—the similarity of the minutes and transcripts of each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting—is largely, though not entirely, shaped by FOMC leadership. Monetary policy shocks have about a 40 percent larger effect on nominal and real interest rates when the prevailing level of transparency is high, suggesting an important role for transparency in determining the efficacy of monetary policy. These effects are primarily driven by transparency about monetary policy strategies conditional on the state of the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Acosta, 2023. "A New Measure of Central Bank Transparency and Implications for the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(3), pages 49-97, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2023:q:3:a:2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Lustenberger & Enzo Rossi, 2020. "Does Central Bank Transparency and Communication Affect Financial and Macroeconomic Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(2), pages 153-201, March.
    2. Geraats, Petra M., 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt0hw7h7cp, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    4. Anna Naszodi & Csaba Csavas & Daniel Felcser, 2016. "Which Aspects of Central Bank Transparency Matter? A Comprehensive Analysis of the Effect of Transparency of Survey Forecasts," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 12(4), pages 147-192, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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