Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities When Preferences Are State-Dependent
AbstractThis paper presents an experimental design that enables the elicitation of subjective probabilities of decision makers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory and are state-dependent. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
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- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010.
"Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging,"
IDEI Working Papers
643, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 17-40.
- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010. "Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging," LERNA Working Papers 10.26.332, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010. "Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging," TSE Working Papers 10-213, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010. "Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging," TSE Working Papers 10-156, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G, 2005.
"Comparative risk aversion for state-dependent preferences,"
Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers
151172, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Robert G. Chambers & John Quiggin, 2005. "Comparative Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Preferences," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP5R05, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00272928 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00272928, HAL.
- Mariana Blanco & Dirk Engelmann & Alexander Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2010.
"Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?,"
Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 412-438, December.
- Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2008. "Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem?," IZA Discussion Papers 3517, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Robert Chambers & Tigran Melkonyan, 2008. "Eliciting beliefs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 271-284, December.
- Karni, Edi, 2008. "Unknowable states and choice-based definitions of subjective probabilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 534-536, June.
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Vialle, Isabelle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 698-714, November.
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