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Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Unionized Industry

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  • Doiron, Denise J

Abstract

Input and output data are used in conjunction with negotiated.wages and employment to estimate a fully specified bargaining model between a labor union (the International Woodworkers of America) and representatives from the British Columbia wood products industry. Bargaining powers are modeled as functions of exogenous variables believed.to have influenced the parties' relative strike costs. The estimated bargaining powers are plotted over time and compared to the proportion of rents captured by each party. Parameters of the union utility function and the firms' technology are also estimated and hypothesis tests are conducted on various aspects of the model. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 33 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 583-606

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:33:y:1992:i:3:p:583-606

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Cited by:
  1. John T. Addison & Pedro Portugal & José Varejão, 2014. "Labour Demand Research: Towards a Better Match between Better Theory and Better Data," Working Papers w201409, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  2. Hirsch, Boris & Schnabel, Claus, 2011. "Let's Take Bargaining Models Seriously: The Decline in Union Power in Germany, 1992-2009," IZA Discussion Papers 5875, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. S. Dobbelaere & J. Mairesse, 2009. "Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 09/586, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  4. Ellen Brock & Sabien Dobbelaere, 2003. "Has International Trade Affected Workers?Bargaining Power?," LICOS Discussion Papers 13603, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  5. Jennifer C. Smith, 1996. "Effet du pouvoir de négociation et du marché local du travail sur la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 1-17.
  6. Paul Heidhues, 2000. "Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  7. Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Lobbying costs and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 126-136, March.
  8. Limão, Nuno & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 186-205.
  9. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00674033 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  11. repec:dgr:uvatin:2009001 is not listed on IDEAS

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