Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue
AbstractUsing a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, the author discusses the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. It is observed that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit, rather than implicit taxation.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by IUP Publications in its journal The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics.
Volume (Year): IV (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 75 - 89
Contact details of provider:
Other versions of this item:
- Rangan Gupta, 2005. "Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue," Working papers 2005-33, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-63, September.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Gray, Jo Anna & Wu, Ying, 1995. "On equilibrium credit rationing and interest rates," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 405-420.
- Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004.
"Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?,"
CREMA Working Paper Series
2004-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Schneider, Friedrich & Klinglmair, Robert, 2004. "Shadow Economies around the World: What Do We Know?," IZA Discussion Papers 1043, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we know?," Economics working papers 2004-03, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004. "Shadow Economies around the World: What Do We Know?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1167, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011.
"Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion,"
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 489-500.
- Rangan Gupta, 2005.
"Tax Evasion and Financial Repression,"
2005-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2007.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (G R K Murthy).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.