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Dual Class Model and Shareholder Agreements: An Analysis of Italian Companies

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  • Anna Paola Micheli
  • Carmelo Intrisano
  • Anna Maria Calce

Abstract

This paper analysed the changes in ownership concentration of the Italian financial market and the recourse to dual class model and shareholder agreements by Italian listed companies in the period 2009-2020. The analysis shows that the control market did not show signs in the period that would lead to presume an increase in the contestability of our companies. The attenuation in ownership concentration, highlighted by the reduction in the value of the Shapley-Shubik index, and the increase in the average market participation did not produce an increase in the contestability of Italian listed companies since the high concentration and limited contestability of control continue to characterize their ownership structures. Findings also show less recourse by the Italian companies to the instruments of separation between ownership and control in the considered period. The reduction in the number of companies that resort to the issue of shares without voting rights and the shareholders' agreements is also reflected in the lower incidence of the capitalization of these companies compared to the market capitalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Paola Micheli & Carmelo Intrisano & Anna Maria Calce, 2022. "Dual Class Model and Shareholder Agreements: An Analysis of Italian Companies," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 15(1), pages 121-121, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ibrjnl:v:15:y:2022:i:1:p:121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2010. "Signaling in Tender Offer Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp655, Financial Markets Group.
    2. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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