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Legal Aspects of the Evaluation of Tenders in Public Procurement Procedures in the Polish Mining Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Kamil Mucha

    (Department of Machinery Engineering and Transport, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Robotics, AGH University of Krakow, al. A. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Krakow, Poland)

  • Dawid Chaba

    (Department of Administrative Law and Civil Society, Institute of Law, Economics, and Administration, University of the National Education Commission, Krakow, ul. Podchorążych 2, 30-084 Krakow, Poland)

  • Katarzyna Midor

    (Department of Production Engineering, Faculty of Organization and Management, Silesian University of Technology, ul. Roosevelta, 26-28, 41-800 Zabrze, Poland)

Abstract

Public procurement procedures facilitate the purchase of products, services, or civil works by public administrations. In Poland, they follow the national rules specified in the Public Procurement Act. Public procurement aims to ensure a transparent and competitive purchasing process, effective use of public resources, equal treatment of all tenderers, and supply of the best products and services. Various aspects of tender evaluation often determine public procurement and the actual process. Of fundamental importance are price and quality. The Polish mining industry is very mature and includes many stakeholders, such as underground, surface, and borehole mines. Public procurement in the mining industry is specialised and involves complex contracts between the contracting authority and the contractor. Additionally, the mining industry involves very high-risk levels and requires special safety efforts. Therefore, this article presents the analysis results related to evaluating offers in public tenders in the most prominent Polish enterprises of the mining industry. The results indicated what procedures should be carried out and what offer evaluation criteria are essential. The emphasis was placed on ensuring that the selection of offers in this industry are not based only on one criterion: price.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamil Mucha & Dawid Chaba & Katarzyna Midor, 2023. "Legal Aspects of the Evaluation of Tenders in Public Procurement Procedures in the Polish Mining Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(21), pages 1-15, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:21:p:15421-:d:1270251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grzegorz Krawczyk, 2019. "Selection of Public Transport Operator in Public Procurement System in Poland," Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, in: Michał Suchanek (ed.), Challenges of Urban Mobility, Transport Companies and Systems, pages 25-34, Springer.
    2. Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che, 2004. "Competitive Procurement with Corruption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 50-68, Spring.
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