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Nash Equilibria in Two-Resource Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions

Author

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  • Fatima Khanchouche

    (Fundamental and Numerical Mathematics Laboratory, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences, Ferhat Abbas University of Setif 1, Setif 19137, Algeria
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Samir Sbabou

    (Center of Research in Economics and Management, University of Caen, Esplanade de la Paix, 14000 Caen, France
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Hatem Smaoui

    (Center of Economics and Management of the Indian Ocean, University of Réunion, 15 Avenue René Cassin, BP 7115, 97715 Saint Denis, Cedex 9, France
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Abderrahmane Ziad

    (CREM—Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management, UNICAEN—Université de Caen Normandie, NU—Normandie Université, 14000 Caen, France
    Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées (LaMA), Ferhat Abbas University of Setif 1, Setif 19137, Algeria
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We also provide a computation algorithm based on our theoretical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Fatima Khanchouche & Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2024. "Nash Equilibria in Two-Resource Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-10, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:15:y:2024:i:2:p:7-:d:1346235
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Konur, Dinçer & Geunes, Joseph, 2012. "Competitive multi-facility location games with non-identical firms and convex traffic congestion costs," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 373-385.
    2. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    3. Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 334-339.
    4. Xu, Chunhui, 2000. "Computation of noncooperative equilibria in ordinal games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 115-122, April.
    5. Ron Holzman & Dov Monderer, 2015. "Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 647-666, August.
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