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Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents

Author

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  • Roberto Sarkisian

    (Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, Italy)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i) excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract-inducing pooling equilibria in which all agents are incentivized to exert a high level of effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Sarkisian, 2021. "Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-11, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:4:p:77-:d:660630
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roberto Sarkisian, 2017. "Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-24, September.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011. "Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
    4. Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2011. "Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 499-522, July.
    5. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    6. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January.
    7. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May.
    8. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2017. "Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-21, September.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    10. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2018. "The Optimal Contract under Adverse Selection in a Moral-Hazard Model with a Risk-Averse Agent," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-22, March.
    11. Sarkisian, Roberto, 2017. "Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?," TSE Working Papers 17-838, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    12. Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.
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    Cited by:

    1. Esteban Muñoz Sobrado, 2022. "Taxing Moral Agents," CESifo Working Paper Series 9867, CESifo.

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