Informational easing: improving credit conditions through the release of information
AbstractEconomist Matthew Pritsker of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System offers a theoretical view on how regulators can reduce uncertainty in the financial markets by improving the availability of information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Economic Policy Review.
Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): Aug ()
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