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Can competition among local governments constrain government spending?

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  • Randall W. Eberts
  • Timothy J. Gronberg

Abstract

An examination of the relationship between the number of local governmental units and the share of personal income going to local government expenditures, considering competition among both general-purpose and single-purpose government units.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Review.

Volume (Year): (1988)
Issue (Month): Q I ()
Pages: 2-9

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1988:i:qi:p:2-9:n:v.24no.1

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Keywords: Expenditures; Public ; Municipal finance;

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Cited by:
  1. Grassmueck, Georg & Goetz, Stephan J. & Shields, Martin, 2008. "Youth Out-Migration from Pennsylvania: The Roles of Government Fragmentation vs. the Beaten Path Effect," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 38(1).
  2. George Crowley & Russell Sobel, 2011. "Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 5-30, October.
  3. Göbel, Jürgen, 2009. "How can the power of Leviathans be measured?," MPRA Paper 13924, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. G. Gulsun Arikan, 2004. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-195, 03.
  5. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Robert McNab, 1997. "Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth, and Democratic Governance," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9707, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  6. Blair, John P. & Staley, Sam, 1995. "Quality competition and public schools: Further evidence," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 193-198, June.
  7. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgaessner & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2010. "Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 27-48, July.
  8. Rexford E. Santerre, 1991. "Leviathan or Median-Voter: Who Runs City Hall?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 5-14, Jan-Mar.
  9. Fox, William F. & Gurley, Tami, 2006. "Will consolidation improve sub-national governments ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3913, The World Bank.
  10. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2001. "The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 617, CESifo Group Munich.

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