Leviathan or Median-Voter: Who Runs City Hall?
AbstractThis study examines the effect of interjurisdictional competition and city age, as a proxy for special interest group activities, on the size of city government. Unlike previous studies on the Leviathan theory, the empirical analysis is well grounded in a median-voter model. The empirical results find mixed support for a Leviathan in city hall. On the one hand, city expenditures are found to be higher rather than lower with more intense competition. On the other hand, longer periods of democratic stability, measured by uninterrupted years of incorporation as a city, are associated with increased public expenditures, as a Leviathan-type model predicts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 17 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (Jan-Mar)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
Government; Interest Group; Voter;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nelson, Michael A, 1987. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 198-204, March.
- Zax, Jeffrey S, 1989. "Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 560-67, June.
- Forbes, Kevin F & Zampelli, Ernest M, 1989. "Is Leviathan a Mythical Beast?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 568-77, June.
- Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell, 1986. "Interest groups and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-145, January.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
- Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
- Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-96, June.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
- Randall W. Eberts & Timothy J. Gronberg, 1988. "Can competition among local governments constrain government spending?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 2-9.
- Fox, William F. & Gurley, Tami, 2006. "Will consolidation improve sub-national governments ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3913, The World Bank.
- Laurie Bates & Rexford Santerre, 2006. "Leviathan in the Crosshairs," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 133-145, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.