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Depositor discipline at failing banks

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  • John S. Jordan
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    Abstract

    Uninsured depositors, whose deposits are not fully protected by federal deposit insurance, have an incentive to monitor banks' activities and impose additional funding costs on risky banks. This pricing is a form of market discipline, since the market penalizes banks for taking on greater risk. For banks that become troubled, market discipline can take a more severe form: Market participants may become unwilling to supply uninsured funds at any reasonable price. This study examines the effectiveness of depositor discipline at banks that failed in New England in the early 1990s. ; The empirical analysis examines whether failing banks in New England faced depositor discipline as they became troubled in the early 1990s, and whether these banks attempted to shield themselves from this discipline. Failing banks in New England experienced a 70 percent decline in their uninsured deposits in their final two years of operation. The author finds that despite the magnitude of the gap to fill, and despite the presence of close regulatory scrutiny, many failing banks increased their use of insured deposits enough to offset much of the shortfall created by the decline in uninsured deposits, diminishing the effectiveness of market discipline by depositors.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its journal New England Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): (2000)
    Issue (Month): Mar ()
    Pages: 15-28

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    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:2000:i:mar:p:15-28

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    Related research

    Keywords: Bank failures ; New England ; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

    References

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    1. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May.
    2. John Jordan & Jane Katz, 1999. "Banking in the age of information technology," Regional Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Q4, pages 24-30.
    3. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1997. "FDICIA after Five Years," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 139-158, Summer.
    4. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1993. "The Capital Crunch: Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 243, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Flannery, Mark J, 1982. "Retail Bank Deposits as Quasi-Fixed Factors of Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 527-36, June.
    6. Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 23-31.
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    Cited by:
    1. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2006. "Can feedback from the jumbo CD market improve bank surveillance?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 135-175.
    2. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    3. Abhiman Das & Saibal Ghosh, 2004. "Market Discipline In The Indian Banking Sector: An Empirical Exploration," Finance 0410020, EconWPA.
    4. Spiegel, Mark M. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2007. "Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 769-786, March.
    5. Juha-Pekka Niinimäki, 2003. "Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance under Adverse Selection," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 38-48, Spring.
    6. Andrew Davenport & Kathleen McDill, 2006. "The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 93-109, August.
    7. Yuliang Wu & Michael Bowe, 2010. "Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 159-186, December.
    8. McIntyre, M.L. & Tripe, David & Zhuang, Xiaojie (Jeff), 2009. "Testing for effective market supervision of New Zealand banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 25-34, January.
    9. Kathleen McDill & Andrea M. Maechler, 2003. "Dynamic Depositor Discipline in U.S. Banks," IMF Working Papers 03/226, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Klaus Schaeck, 2008. "Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 163-179, June.
    11. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
    12. Hadad, Muliaman D. & Agusman, Agusman & Monroe, Gary S. & Gasbarro, Dominic & Zumwalt, James Kenton, 2011. "Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1552-1562, June.
    13. John R. Hall & Thomas B. King & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Did FDICIA enhance market discipline on community banks? a look at evidence from the jumbo-CD market," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-04, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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