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Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the Treaty of Amsterdam

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  • Pollack, Mark A.
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    Abstract

    This paper applies a principal-agent model of delegation, agency and agenda setting to the 1996 intergovernmental conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam, in order to understand both the delegation of powers to supranational organizations in the new Treaty, and the efforts of such organizations to set the agenda for the conference. At Amsterdam, the member governments of the European Union delegated new powers to the Commission, the Court of Justice, and especially the European Parliament; these new powers, however, are carefully hedged with elaborate mechanisms to control, if not eliminate, supranational autonomy in the future. In the intergovernmental conference, moreover, the EU�s supranational organizations attempted to influence the outcome of the negotiations as informal agenda setters, but they were limited in their ability to do so by the information-rich content of the IGC. However, while the influence of the Commission, Court and Parliament was indeed limited in the intergovernmental conference and at Amsterdam, we should beware of generalizing from IGCs to the day-to-day workings of EU politics, where the powers of the supranational organizations are far greater than in any intergovernmental conference.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A) in its journal European Integration online Papers (EIoP).

    Volume (Year): 3 (1999)
    Issue (Month): (04)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0039

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    Related research

    Keywords: agency theory; agenda-setting; comitology; European Commission; European Court of Justice; European Parliament; IGC 1996; institutionalism; Amsterdam Treaty; political science;

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    Cited by:
    1. Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, 2006. "Codecision and Institutional Change," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 41, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    2. Berthold Rittberger, 2003. "Removing conceptual blinders: Under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ affect institutional design decisions?," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0023, University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages.
    3. Jens Steffek, 2008. "Public Accountability and the Public Sphere of International Governance," RECON Online Working Papers Series 3, RECON.

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