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Role of social capital in the formation of attitudes to market economy in Ukraine

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  • Yu. Sereda

Abstract

The paper examines how different forms of social capital are associated with the development of a market economy. Differences between bonding (intragroup relations) and bridging (intergroup relations) social capital as well as negative social capital (illegal relations) are considered in the framework of readiness for economic transformation, attitudes to private property and demand for state regulation of the economy. Statistical analysis is based on data provided by the Institute of Sociology (NAS, Ukraine, 2013 wave); multinomial regression analysis is used. The study empirically confirms that the link between social capital and positive attitudes to market economy depends on the form of social capital (priority of intragroup or intergroup relations). It is demonstrated that high power of bonding relations and lack of confidence in economic and public administration institutions rather characterizes the demand for "anti-market" strategy and greater role of the state. Research shows that the more an individual solves problems through a network of family, relatives and friends, the lower is the probability of a positive attitude toward market institutions and the greater is the probability of paternalism. It is proved that development of civic participation in Putnam organizations (condominiums, environmental movements, sport, youth organizations etc.) is critical for strengthening the consolidating effect of social capital in Ukrainian society because odds of choosing active strategy for inclusion in the new economic practices among members of such organizations are two times greater than odds among others.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu. Sereda, 2015. "Role of social capital in the formation of attitudes to market economy in Ukraine," Economy and Forecasting, Valeriy Heyets, issue 2, pages 72-89.
  • Handle: RePEc:eip:journl:y:2015:i:2:p:72-89
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