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Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness

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Author Info

  • Dell'Anno, Roberto

Abstract

This paper aims to show that aggregate tax evasion may be largely explained by tax morale and that tax morale is dependent on the taxpayers' intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma. The theoretical hypothesis is that these attitudes are influenced by the taxpayers' perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens. Applying Gordon's [Gordon, J.P.F., 1989. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review 33(4), 797-805] framework, a dynamic model of aggregate tax evasion is proposed whereby multiple equilibria may emerge. Econometric analysis on Latin American countries supports the assumptions made in the model.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 988-997

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Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:38:y:2009:i:6:p:988-997

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175

Related research

Keywords: Tax evasion Tax morale Fairness Social stigma;

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Cited by:
  1. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
  2. Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201239, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  3. Piolatto, Amedeo & Rablen, Matthew D., 2013. "Prospect Theory and Tax Evasion: A Reconsideration of the Yitzhaki Puzzle," IZA Discussion Papers 7760, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2013. "Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth," MPRA Paper 48427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Nichita Ramona-Anca & Batrancea Larissa-Margareta, 2012. "The Implications Of Tax Morale On Tax Compliance Behavior," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 739-744, July.

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