Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness
AbstractThis paper aims to show that aggregate tax evasion may be largely explained by tax morale and that tax morale is dependent on the taxpayers' intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma. The theoretical hypothesis is that these attitudes are influenced by the taxpayers' perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens. Applying Gordon's [Gordon, J.P.F., 1989. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review 33(4), 797-805] framework, a dynamic model of aggregate tax evasion is proposed whereby multiple equilibria may emerge. Econometric analysis on Latin American countries supports the assumptions made in the model.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Tax evasion Tax morale Fairness Social stigma;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011.
"Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion,"
Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012.
"Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen)
201239, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Bazart, C. & Bonein, A., 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 83-102.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Working Papers 12-35, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2012.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Post-Print halshs-00867505, HAL.
- Piolatto, Amedeo & Rablen, Matthew D., 2013.
"Prospect Theory and Tax Evasion: A Reconsideration of the Yitzhaki Puzzle,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7760, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Amadeo Piolatto & Matthew Rablen, 2013. "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki Puzzle," IFS Working Papers W13/25, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2013. "Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth," MPRA Paper 48427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nichita Ramona-Anca & Batrancea Larissa-Margareta, 2012. "The Implications Of Tax Morale On Tax Compliance Behavior," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 739-744, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.